Problem Definition: New work arrangements coordinated by gig-economy platforms offer workers discretion over their work schedules at the expense of traditional worker protections. We empirically measure the impact of expanding access to gigs on worker welfare, with a focus on low-income families.
Introduction
On-demand peer-to-peer services ('gigs') coordinated by platforms like Uber, Lyft, and Postmates rely on independent workers to provide service. Independent workers enjoy complete control over their work schedules. Workers may use this autonomy to schedule gig work around their existing day jobs to supplement their income, or workers may use gigs as a substitute for more conventional forms of work to increase or improve the timing of their leisure time. The drawback of this independence is the lack of traditional employment protections. In particular, worker autonomy over work hours makes infeasible minimum hourly wage guarantees. Instead platforms pay workers per completed service, so the amount a worker earns depends on the number of consumers seeking service. For example, an hour spent driving for Uber may be a lucrative use of time on a busy night but may not even cover expenses on a slow afternoon. The absence of worker protections from this business model has provoked a string of lawsuits aimed at Uber and Postmates (Lien, 2016; Bhardwaj, 2018) and skepticism that gigs improve worker welfare (McCabe and Devaney, 2015) .
The aim of this paper is to understand the impact the gig economy has on worker welfare. In addition to informing workers' choices about participating in the gig economy, our analysis should attract the attention of firms who are increasingly organizing their operations around independent workers. The worker welfare associated with this arrangement impacts worker turnover, as well as the likelihood that regulators intervene. For example, New York City has considered enforcing a minimum hourly wage for ride-share drivers (Siddiqui, 2018) and recently imposed a cap on ride-share drivers (Shapiro, 2018) in the name of driver welfare.
We focus on a specific dimension of welfare, which we call financial hardship. A family experiences financial hardship when it fails to pay its bills on time. Though this measure is related to more accessible indicators of financial stability, like annual income, a family whose income is volatile may appear to be financially stable (i.e. annual income > annual expenses) while still experiencing transient financial hardship. This is particularly likely for families with few savings to draw on in months when expenses exceed earnings. For this reason, we are particularly interested in the welfare of low-income families for whom financial hardship is a pressing concern.
We empirically study changes in financial hardship following an expansion of access to gigs.
We employ a novel data set documenting survey responses to detailed questions about low-income families' financial security. These data include an explicit measure of financial hardship, as well as granular information about potential antecedents to hardship. In particular, we conceptualize hardship as a function of the long-run average income earned by a family, the volatility of that income over time, the long-run average expenses of a family, and the volatility of expenses. The richness of our data allows for exploration of not only steady-state causes of hardship (e.g. annual income and expenses) but also transient causes of hardship (e.g. month-to-month variability in income and unexpected expenses).
Gigs represent an opportunity for families to improve their welfare both by increasing income, and reducing income volatility. The flexibility of gigs allows workers to work in their spare time, theoretically allowing workers to increase the time they spend earning, increasing income. Additionally, the flexibility of gigs allows workers to adjust to shocks in other sources of income. For example, a worker who receives fewer shifts than usual at his day job may supplement his income by spending those hours working for Uber. In doing so, the worker avoids finding himself with insufficient funds to cover his rent at the end of the month. These positive effects should have the greatest impact on low-income families, who have the greatest need to supplement their income and are more likely to experience unpredictable work schedules (White, 2015) .
However, gigs also have the potential to reduce worker welfare. Gigs empower workers to make their own work schedule, but workers in other contexts have used flexibility to trade money for time (Smithson et al., 2004) . Organizational behavior literature suggests that workers are more likely to make this trade the less clear the value of their time is (DeVoe and Pfeffer, 2007; Okada and Hoch, 2004) . The dependence of gig pay on demand obfuscates the value of time spent working, especially in comparison to hourly-wage jobs, potentially prompting workers to work less when gigs become available. Furthermore, the lack of a fixed hourly pay rate with gigs may increase income volatility, causing more workers to experience financial hardship. These negative effects on welfare are most likely to affect low-income families, who more frequently work jobs that pay by the hour and are more vulnerable to income volatility (Gunderson and Gruber, 2001; Bania and Leete, 2007) . Gigs also impose costs on workers, who are responsible for all on-the-job expenses. These costs may increase both the level and the volatility of workers' expenses. For example, when gigs require the use of a worker's personal resource (e.g. a car), gigs may increase the likelihood of an unexpected repair.
To determine the impact of gigs on worker welfare, we study the effect of the launch of Uber's UberX service on rates of financial hardship. Taking advantage of the geographic and temporal staggering of the launch of UberX across locations, we estimate the causal effect of this launch on financial outcomes via a difference-in-differences design, which controls for time-invariant geographic heterogeneity as well as macroeconomic shocks experienced simultaneously across locations. Our work joins a growing body of literature leveraging the sequential roll-out of gigs in this way (Burtch et al., 2018; Greenwood and Wattal, 2017; Li et al., 2016b; Barrios et al., 2018; Zervas et al., 2017) .
Our analysis shows that the entry of UberX leads to significantly higher rates of hardship among low-income families. We test four possible mechanisms for this increase: long-run earnings, longrun expenses, income volatility, and expense volatility. We find that, while UberX lowers income volatility, it also decreases overall take-home pay for low-income families. We find no discernible effect on expense volatility. The net effect is lowered welfare for low-income families.
Our analysis makes two main contributions. First, we caution that gigs can be harmful to the most vulnerable members of society. This bolsters the position of Uber drivers suing for employee status and governments seeking to regulate Uber and similar platforms. These findings should give us pause when we consider how the new, flexible work arrangements championed by the gig economy will shape the future of work. Second, our analysis gives guidance for how low-income worker welfare might be preserved within the gig economy framework. We find that increased hardship is driven by decreased take-home pay, not increased income volatility. Indeed, we find that gigs decrease income volatility. This suggests that regulations designed to boost per-service payments, like New York's cap on ride-share drivers, are more effective than efforts to reduce income volatility, like proposals to impose a minimum hourly wage. These results highlight the possibility for well-designed gigs to improve the welfare of low-income workers by allowing them to mitigate income volatility.
Literature Review
There has been a wealth of recent interest in the operations of the gig economy. Most existing work concerns the design of platform profit-maximizing matching (e.g. Feng et al. (2017) ; Ozkan and Ward (2017); Hu and Zhou (2015) ) and pricing (e.g. Cachon et al. (2017) ; Bimpikis et al. (2016); Tang et al. (2016); Hu and Zhou (2017) ; Taylor (2018); Chen and Hu (2017); Guda and Subramanian (2018) ). Of particular relevance are papers focusing on welfare implications of gig-economy platforms and their policies. Cachon et al. (2017) shows surge pricing can benefit consumers by increasing supply availability. Castillo et al. (2017) shows that surge pricing can destroy welfare by sending workers on wild goose chases during times of low demand. Afèche et al. (2018) shows that increasing platform control improves worker welfare and platform profit. Benjaafar et al. (2018) and Nikzad (2018) show that platform efforts to recruit ever more workers do not necessarily destroy worker welfare by increasing competition but can also improve worker welfare by attracting more consumers. Kalkanci et al. (2018) suggests that the gig economy has the potential to increase economic inclusion by providing flexible income sources to low-income populations. In this paper we demonstrate the extent to which this potential is realized.
The gig economy has inspired a number of empirical analyses (Kabra et al., 2018; Karacaoglu et al., 2018; Li et al., 2016a) . Many of these studies have focused on estimating supply elasticity (e.g. Chen and Sheldon (2016) ; Cullen and Farronato (2014); Sheldon (2016); Hall et al. (2017) ).
Others have compared Uber to conventional taxis, concluding that Uber better utilizes its drivers (Cramer and Krueger, 2016) and that drivers benefit from Uber's compensation scheme relative to the weekly or daily leases common in the taxi industry (Angrist et al., 2017) . Our analysis estimates the causal impact of the launch of UberX in a location via a difference-in-differences model. A similar approach has been used to study the effect of the entrance of a gig-economy platform on entrepreneurship (Burtch et al., 2018 ), DUI citations (Greenwood and Wattal, 2017 ), congestion (Li et al., 2016b , traffic fatalities (Barrios et al., 2018) , and incumbent industry market share (Kroft and Pope, 2014; Zervas et al., 2017) .
The spread of gigs represents an increase in the availability of flexible work arrangements. In general, contingent work arrangements have been shown to benefit firms by allowing them to only pay for the workers they need (Kesavan et al., 2014; Milner and Pinker, 2001; Pinker and Larson, 2003) . This translates to the ride-sharing setting via improved utilization of Uber drivers relative to taxi drivers (Cramer and Krueger, 2016) . Workers also stand to benefit from these flexible work arrangements via the discretion allowed workers over their work schedules. Workers with this discretion should be better able to integrate their work with other obligations. In particular, discretion should allow workers to supplement their income from day jobs more easily (most Uber drivers hold another job (Hall and Krueger, 2015) ). However, discretion also allows workers to prioritize non-lucrative activities and is not always used to further a worker's career (Smithson et al., 2004) .
Gigs also influence the volatility of worker income. The discretion associated with gigs should allow workers to increase their time spent on gig-activities in response to an unexpected decrease in outside income, thereby decreasing income volatility (Farrell and Greig, 2016) . This is particularly valuable for low-income families, who typically lack sufficient savings to weather downward shocks to their income (Gunderson and Gruber, 2001; Bania and Leete, 2007) . However, because gigs pay per service instead of per hour, gigs also inherently increase per-hour income volatility. This volatility is amplified by dynamic pricing policies, like Uber's Surge Price, which pays workers more per service during times of high demand. Our analysis contributes to the literature studying the effect of income volatility on low-income workers by demonstrating the net effect of these competing forces.
Data and Descriptive Statistics
To construct our main dependent variables, we rely on two surveys. The first is the Household Financial Survey (HFS), which documents survey responses of a random sample of taxpayers qualifying for TurboTax's Freedom Edition free tax filing package. To qualify for this "freefile" option, a household must have an adjusted gross income no greater than $33,000 ($66,000 for active duty military personnel) or must have received the earned income tax credit. This restriction allows us to focus our analysis on low-income families, who we suspect will experience the greatest impact from the introduction of UberX. Surveys were administered each year from 2013 to 2017 at the time of tax filing, and the number of respondents varied from year to year. The survey asks questions about financial behaviors, demographics, and location. Survey participants additionally consent to share their anonymized tax returns. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics.
Our main dependent variable, hardship, measures financial hardship according to the binary response to, "Was there a time in the past X months when you or someone in your household skipped paying a bill or paid a bill late due to not having enough money?" (1 indicates yes). Note that this question refers to the time interval beginning twelve months (i.e. X = 12) before the survey in 2013 and 2014, while subsequent years refer only to the interval beginning six months before the survey (i.e. X = 6). Though this leads to more reports of financial hardship in earlier waves of the survey, the increase happens across the board (as opposed to only in locations with UberX), so this difference across survey years is absorbed by the survey-year fixed effect included in our analysis. Note that all other survey questions used to construct dependent variables in this paper are consistently worded across relevant survey waves.
To explore the mechanisms through which UberX increases financial hardship, we study several additional dependent variables from this survey. One mechanism we consider is income volatility.
Respondents are asked:
Which of the following best describes your household's income over the last 6 months?
1. Roughly the same amount each month 2. Roughly the same most months, but some unusually high or low months 3. Often changes quite a bit from one month to the next We classify respondents who select Choice 2 as experiencing moderate income volatility and respondents who select Choice 3 as experiencing severe income volatility. We also consider respondents who report experiencing any income variability by selecting either Choice 2 or Choice 3. The associated dependent variables are mod vol, hi vol, and any vol respectively, where 1 indicates that a respondent belongs to that category.
The hardship experienced by respondents may also be the result of unexpected expenses. We consider three categories of unexpected expenses: car repairs, medical expenses, and legal expenses.
Driving for Uber causes additional wear and tear on a vehicle. When not properly prepared for, this may lead to more frequent unexpected car repairs. Driving for Uber also increases the driver's exposure to vehicle collisions (Barrios et al., 2018) , which may lead to medical and legal costs. Compounding potential medical costs is the lack of employer-provided health insurance when working for Uber. To measure the potential increase in these expense categories, we use respondents' answers to the following question:
In the last 6 months, have you or has any member of your tax household:
1. Made an unexpected major repair to a vehicle you own? 2. Had unexpected major out-of-pocket medical expense (e.g., from hospitalization or emergency room visit)? 3. Had unexpected legal fees or legal expenses?
The binary variables, shock car, shock med and shock legal, take the value of 1 for respondents who experienced an unexpected expense in each respective category. Note that questions interrogating respondent income volatility and unexpected expenses are only available for survey waves 2015-2017. Our analysis of these variables uses the corresponding subset of the HFS data. with demographic and geographic information. We restrict our attention to the 3,835 households with heads of household that are active in the survey during all of the years studied in this analysis (the survey is primarily administered to heads of household). The PSID is a useful supplement to the HFS for several reasons. First, the PSID breaks household income into its component parts (i.e. income from labor, assets, transfers, etc), allowing us to focus on the component affected by UberX entry: labor income. Further, the PSID includes detailed information about respondent work habits, allowing for more detailed explanations of the results of our analysis. Finally, the panel structure of the PSID allows for controls of individual-specific idiosyncrasies. Table 2 provides descriptive statistics.
The PSID surveys families from all income brackets while the HFS surveys only those which qualify to file their taxes for free. To ensure that our analysis of the PSID reflects outcomes of the population studied in the HFS, we split the PSID data into two groups: those deemed "freefile eligible" and those deemed "freefile ineligible." Lacking information on household adjusted gross income, we assign freefile eligibility based on total reported income. Specifically, families deemed freefile eligible reported total income less than $33,000 in 2010, the last year surveyed before Uber first introduced UberX. We designate freefile eligibility based on 2010 income to ensure that group assignment is not influenced by treatment (in our analysis we consider alternative group assignment criteria). Grouping households in this way allows us to identify outcomes specific to low-income households. Tables 3 and 4 provide descriptive statistics for freefile eligible and ineligible families.
In our analysis, we study the expansion of access to gigs via the launch of Uber's UberX service, which allows ordinary car owners (as opposed to licensed livery drivers) to drive for hire. Uber introduced UberX in 2012 and continues to expand; in 2015 75% of the U.S. population had access to UberX (Hawkins, 2015) . Using launch announcements on Uber's blog (uber.com/blog) and in local news outlets, we collect the date of UberX launch for the Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) represented by respondents to the surveys described above. Tables 5 and 6 illustrate the diffusion of UberX's service to locations represented in each survey.
The sequential launch of UberX across locations lends itself to the difference-in-differences design we employ (Angrist and Pischke, 2008; Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003) . Locations without UberX serve as controls for locations that UberX has entered. Locations are considered treated if We make an exception to this assumption when analyzing gross income. Gross income reported on a tax return refers to income earned in the previous calendar year. Consequently, to affect gross income UberX would have to launch before the beginning of the survey year. Similarly, PSID survey questions refer to quantities (e.g. income, work hours) in the year preceding the survey year. For analysis of HFS income and PSID quantities, a location is considered treated if UberX launches before January of the survey year.
We take advantage of the longitudinal nature of both surveys by including relative time dummy variables, which indicate the time remaining and elapsed from treatment (i.e. leads and lags).
Causal interpretation with our difference-in-differences design requires treated and control locations to exhibit parallel trends before treatment. In other words, our causal interpretation would be invalid had Uber chosen locations to launch UberX because of an existing trend in our dependent variables (or because of an unobserved factor correlated with those dependent variables). Though it is unlikely that UberX enters locations randomly, it is plausible that these decisions are independent of financial outcomes experienced by low-income families. Examination of lead variables enables us to evaluate the appropriateness of this assumption. We account for potential serial correlation in errors produced by this longitudinal design by adjusting for clustering at the MSA level.
Finally, we include in our analysis controls for potential MSA-level heterogeneity. We obtain estimates of population, education, and employment from the U.S. Census. Tables 5 and 6 summarize these variables for each survey.
Analysis of Hardship
Our main analysis studies the effect of UberX entry on the likelihood a family experiences financial hardship. Our dependent variable is hardship, which indicates whether a respondent failed to pay bills on time some months before the survey (as defined in Section 3). Let i index individuals, j index MSAs, and t index survey years. We estimate:
where α t is the survey year fixed effect that absorbs macroeconomics shocks felt across MSAs, as individual characteristics gender, race, education, and marital status. These characteristics do not all vary with time, but they account for variation in the demographical distribution of respondents representing a MSA across time. We further include as time-varying MSA characteristics population, percent of population with a college degree, and employment.
As shown in Table 7 , the launch of UberX corresponds to a significant and lasting increase in financial hardship. In spite of the opportunities UberX offers families to improve their financial security, UberX entry makes families more likely to fail to meet their short-term financial obligations.
These results are robust to sample selection: Column 1 reports results using all waves of data while
Column 2 restricts analysis to data from 2015-2017. Notably, our analysis does not detect any pretreatment trends, indicating that, to the extent UberX launches are not random, they do not target locations with increasing rates of hardship among low-income families. This lends credence to the parallel trends assumption required to interpret these results causally.
Mechanisms
We now turn our attention to possible explanations for why freefile-eligible families experience hardship more frequently after UberX launches in their location. We conceptualize hardship as a function of steady-state income and expenses, as well as the volatility of income and expenses. We capture steady-state income through annual income and steady-state expenses through reported annual expenses. We focus on the expense categories within the ten largest components of household spending according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics whose level is likely to be affected by UberX's entry: childcare, medical care, and transportation (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2018) . UberX may reduce the first by offering flexible work that is easier to schedule around a child's schedule, reducing the need to pay for childcare. The second may be increased by UberX's entry if workers lose employer-sponsored health benefits when they take up Uber driving. The third should certainly increase following UberX's entry as people spend more time driving and burning fuel.
In addition to variables measuring a family's average amount of cash-on-hand, we study the volatility of income and expenses. Especially for families with few savings, transient deviations from the norm can lead families to fail to meet their short-term financial obligations. We capture volatility of income through explicit reports of variability in monthly income, and we use reports of unexpected expenses as measures of expense volatility. We again focus on expense categories whose volatility is likely to be affected by UberX's entry: car repairs, medical expenses, and legal expenses. As shown in Barrios et al. (2018) , Uber's launch increases vehicle collisions, potentially exposing drivers to unexpected vehicle damages, medical costs, and legal fees. In the subsections that follow, we consider each of these mechanisms in turn.
Annual Income
It is natural to expect that UberX's entry could affect the take-home pay of the workers that choose to drive for UberX. Ideally, we would measure this effect through gross income, which measures all earnings less business expenses, including the costs of driving for Uber. As shown in Table 8 , analysis of gross income reported in both data sets does not reveal any lasting significant impact of Uber entry. We therefore restrict our attention to income earned from labor. This measure is contained in the PSID and represents the total annual income from wages, tips, commissions, overtime, professional practice as well as the labor portion of any farm or business income earned by the head of household and spouse within a family. Focusing specifically on labor income reduces the noise in our estimation and allows us to detect a significant impact of UberX entry.
We adjust our analysis to leverage the panel structure of the PSID by introducing an individual fixed effect, λ i . The resulting model is:
To match with biennial nature of the PSID, time in this model is measured in two-year increments.
Further, because the data extend only through 2014, we only include one lag variable (Uber launched in only two MSAs before the end of 2012). The panel structure of the PSID removes the need for most individual level controls; those included -number of children, martial status, and agevary with time. We further include as time-varying MSA characteristics population, percent of population with a college degree, and employment. We separately analyze the effect of UberX entry on freefile-eligible and freefile-ineligible families. Table 9 illustrates the relationship between UberX entry and labor income. Freefile-eligible families report lower labor income in locations where UberX is available. This means that families that would benefit the most from supplemental income earn less following UberX entry. In contrast, freefile-ineligible families experience an increase in their labor income from UberX entry. Note that these finding are robust to alternative definitions of freefile eligibility: Columns 3 and 4 use the more generous income limit applied to active duty military personnel ($66,000) while Columns 5 and 6 apply the original income limit to the average of 2008 and 2010 gross income.
To understand this discrepancy, we examine the working behavior of heads of households and spouses in both freefile eligible and ineligible households. Using as our dependent variables the reported work hours of head, the work hours of spouse, and the household's total work hours in estimation equation (2) yields the results in Table 10 . Following the launch of UberX, heads of household tend to decrease their work hours. In contrast, spouses report working more after UberX launches in their location. The net number of hours worked in freefile-eligible families declines, resulting in lower earnings.
Determining the motivation for workers to change their work habits following UberX's launch is outside the scope of this paper. The behavior of spouses is consistent with literature studying the effect of other forms of flexible work on female labor force participation (survey waves before 2015 specifically refer to "spouses" as "wives"). Less intuitive is the decline in hours the head of household spends working. It is possible that UberX encourages, either through competition or imitation, employers to rely more heavily on contingent labor, reducing the hours available to individual workers. It is also possible that the reduction in hours stems from a demand side effect.
For example, organizational behavior literature would predict that, because the value attached to an hour spent working for Uber is less certain that an hour spent working at a fixed hourly rate, switching to Uber from an hourly wage job would lead workers to work less, all else equal. In both cases, we should expect hourly wage earners, who are disproportionately represented among the freefile-eligible population, to be the most affected. Unfortunately, this contributes to the increased rates of hardship in this population found in Section 4.1.
The results above raise a question of omitted variable bias. Specifically, does UberX enter locations with higher income inequality? To explore this potential confound, we incorporate measures of the Gini index of inequality into our analysis. Provided by the U.S. Census Bureau, the Gini index is a measure of the dispersion of incomes within a MSA. As shown in Columns 7 and 8 of Table 9 and Column 3 in Table 7 , including the Gini index as an MSA-level control does not alter our results. This means that potential correlation between UberX entry and income inequality does not explain the increased hardship and decreased incomes experienced by the residents of locations with access to UberX.
Annual Expenses
In addition to affecting the level of earnings families expect, UberX likely affects their expenses.
The most obvious expenses affected by UberX are transport costs. As independent contractors, Uber drivers are responsible for expenses they incur on the job, including gasoline, for example. Of the remaining categories that contribute most to average household expenses, Uber is most likely to affect medical expenses and child care expenses. Uber does not offer employer-sponsored health care, so drivers may find themselves paying out of pocket if they forfeit such a benefit to drive for Uber. Uber may have a positive impact on domestic expenses, like childcare. If the flexibility offered by Uber allows drivers to plan around the schedules of their children, they may avoid paying for outside help.
Using the PSID, we construct the variables childcare, medical, and gasoline to capture the annual dollars spent by a family on child care, out-of-pocket medical expenses, and gasoline. We substitute these dependent variables into Equation (2) to estimate the effect of UberX's entry on the level of these expenses. for Uber (or at least purchase new health insurance plans on government-sponsored exchanges).
However, Uber drivers do incur significantly higher gasoline expenses, as reported in Column 3.
Though UberX does not drive higher child care or medical costs, it does place the burden of Uber-related business expenses on drivers by design. Taken together with the reduction in earnings reported in Section 5.1, this implies that UberX's launch reduces families' net take home pay.
Income Volatility
To evaluate the effect of UberX's launch on income volatility, we return to data provided by the HFS. We study the likelihood that a family experiences moderate, severe, or any income volatility.
To do this, we re-estimate Equation (1) substituting mod vol, hi vol, and any vol as our dependent variables. Note that because these variables are available for survey waves 2015-2017, there are only two possible lead variables. Table 12 demonstrates that the entry of UberX decreases reports of moderate income volatility.
As shown in Column 1, this effect is significant and sustained following UberX's launch. Analyzing reports of severe income volatility does not reveal any effect of UberX entry (Column 2), perhaps because relatively few (12%) respondents fall in this category. Combining reports severe and moderate income volatility reduces the precision of UberX's effect on income volatility, as shown in Column 3, but continues to indicate that income volatility decreases following UberX's entry.
Pretrends remain absent in these analyses, indicating UberX's launch is the cause of these changes in income volatility.
These results are an interesting addition to the literature studying income volatility and its effects in low income populations. It is established that income volatility is dangerous for families with few savings to draw upon if their regular income does not materialize. This might lead one to conclude that the fee-per-service payment structure of gig work would be inherently damaging for this population. However, gigs also provide a mechanism to counter income volatility. Specifically, gigs allow workers to adjust their hours in response to earnings from either the platform or from outside sources. Our findings demonstrate that this agency counteracts the extra income volatility gigs might impose from their fee-per-service payment model.
Expense Volatility
The final potential drivers of hardship is expense volatility. It is possible that driving for Uber introduces more frequent unexpected expenses, exhausting savings and leading families to fail to pay their bills on time. We focus on expense categories whose volatility existing literature has determined is likely to be affected by UberX's entry: car repairs, medical expenses, and legal expenses. Greater use of a driver's vehicle may lead to more frequent component failures and associated unexpected repairs. Further, as shown in Barrios et al. (2018) , Uber's launch increases collisions, potentially exposing drivers to unexpected vehicle damages, medical costs, and legal fees.
Using the HFS data, we construct the variables shock car, shock med, and shock legal to indicate whether a family experienced an unexpected expense in each category. We substitute these measures as the dependent variable in Equation (1) to estimate the effect of UberX entry on expense variability. These variables are only available for survey waves 2015-2017, so there are only two possible lead variables. The results, reported in Table 13 indicate that UberX does not significantly increase expense volatility. This suggests that, while Uber may cause more collisions, Uber drivers themselves may not be the responsible party. We conclude that cost volatility is not a driving force behind the increased rates of hardship reported in Section 4.
Taken in sum, our results indicate that the rise in hardship documented in Section 4 is attributable to the decline in net take home pay resulting from UberX's entry. Reduced net income leaves workers with a smaller buffer against unanticipated shocks. These shocks are fewer because of UberX -we find that UberX reduces income shocks and has no significant effect on expense shocks. However, the reduction in income volatility is insufficient to compensate for the reduction in total income.
Robustness
In the analysis presented thus far, we have endeavored to demonstrate the robustness of our results in several ways. We have analyzed multiple specifications and shown that our results are not sensitive to these changes. We have explored the role of a plausible confounding variable -income inequality -and shown that our results are not driven by its omission. The insignificance of pretrends in our analysis suggests that treated locations are not systematically different from control locations.
In all analyses, we have clustered standard errors at the MSA level to address the serial correlation of outcomes inherent to the difference-in-differences design. Bertrand et al. (2004) shows that this approach dramatically reduces the probability of false significance when the number of clusters is large.
To ensure that our results are not driven by spurious relationships we conduct a random implementation test along the lines of Bertrand et al. (2004) . In this test, we assign UberX entry dates at random. Dates are chosen from the time horizon beginning with UberX's first launch to two years after the last survey date; this time horizon produces in expectation the same number of treated MSA-survey years as the original data. We generate 1000 versions of this placebo data and analyze the relationship between hardship and UberX therein according to the difference-in-differences model described in Section 4.
The random implementation test generates a distribution of placebo coefficients on the relative time dummies following (placebo) UberX entry, where β k is the coefficient on the indicator of whether UberX entered k years ago. In Table 14 we report the mean and standard deviation of these placebo coefficients. Our random implementation test yields placebo coefficients that are indistinguishable from zero. Furthermore, our estimates of these coefficients in Table 7 are significantly larger than those generated by chance. This indicates that our results are not driven by serial correlation.
Effect on the Treated
Thus far, our results measure the effect of making gigs available. This effect is driven by respondents who take advantage of UberX when it's made available. However, not all respondents in treated locations (i.e. locations where UberX launches) actually drive for Uber. Consequently, our results measure the effect of driving for Uber but are diluted by the many respondents residing in treated locations who don't drive for Uber. In other words, we measure the effect of the intention to treat. This measure is interesting when considering policies that increase or restrict access to gigs.
However, we are also interested in magnitude of effect experienced by individuals that actually work gigs. In this section, we provide a plausible estimate of the effect of driving for Uber on the likelihood of experiencing a financial hardship.
To do this, we employ respondents' answers to the questions:
1. In the past year, did you earn any income through services offered through a mobile app or website (sometimes known as the "Sharing" or "Gig" economy)?
2. Thinking about the income you earned through the mobile app or website, which of the following best describes the work you do?"
• Ride-sharing/transportation services
• Home sharing services
• Making and selling products
• Shopping, delivery or warehouse services
• Performing tasks online (e.g. completing surveys or doing data entry)
• Performing household tasks like packing/moving, cleaning and laundry These questions were added to the HFS in 2017, so this information is unavailable for longitudinal analyses like difference-in-differences. Instead, we employ a nearest-neighbor propensity score matching algorithm to match the 1.5% of respondents who reported working a ride-sharing gig to respondents that did not work a ride-sharing gig but who are estimated to be just as likely to have worked a ride-sharing gig. The goal is to construct a control sample of respondents that are sufficiently similar in the attributes that predict ride-sharing that comparing ride-sharing respondents with the control sample illustrates the causal effect of ride-sharing on hardship (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983).
To estimate respondents' propensity to work a ride-sharing gig, we build a model relating the observed behavior of ride-sharing to observable variables that predict ride-sharing but are unaffected by a respondent's decision to ride-share. These variables include respondent demographics, location, and financial health. Demographic information is a proxy for a respondent's interest in gigs. A respondent's location determines whether he has access to ride-sharing. The decision to ride-share is also intrinsically liked to historical financial well-being, though many financial measures are also influenced by ride-sharing. To capture a respondent's historical financial health, we include respondent education level, the education level of the respondent's parents and information about unexpected changes to the respondent's financial health. Specifically, we include whether a respondent lost a job, was victim of crime, experienced a major life change (e.g. birth, marriage), or incurred unexpected costs from vehicle repairs, legal expenses, home repairs, out-of-pocket medical expenses, or expenses from natural disasters. While it is plausible that a respondent's experience of crime, and vehicle, medical, and legal expenses may be increased by ride-sharing, our previous analyses do not find any statistically significant relationship.
We estimate respondents propensity to work a ride-sharing gig via the following logistic model:
where uber i is an indicator of whether respondent i worked a ride-sharing gig; X i is a vector of demographic variables, including race, education, marital status, gender, and parental education;
M SA i is the MSA in which respondent i resides; and Z i is a vector of indicators of whether respondent i experienced any of the unexpected changes in financial health described above. Respondents who worked a ride-sharing gig are matched to the respondent with the most similar predicted probability of ride-sharing. All other respondents are excluded from consideration.
Using the dataset comprising the ride-sharing respondents and their matches, we investigate the relationship between ride-sharing and hardship. Specifically, we estimate the following:
Effective matching ensures that the distributions of observables that predict ride-sharing are the same for both ride-sharing respondents and their matches. This means that any relationship between hardship and ride-sharing is not a result of selection based on these observables. For example, a respondent who is short on money is both more likely to experience hardship and to ride-share, creating a positive correlation between hardship and ride-sharing. However, if we compare this respondent to a respondent in a similar financial situation who does not ride-share, then we can conclude that any estimated relationship between hardship and ride-sharing is not the driven by respondent financial health preceding the decision to ride-share. Table 15 demonstrates that our matching procedure produces well balanced distributions of observables across the treatment and control conditions. We argue that our estimate of β in Equation 3 represents the causal effect of ride-sharing on hardship. Table 16 reports a positive and significant estimate of the relationship between hardship and ride-sharing. Our estimate of β, the effect of ride-sharing, corresponds to an odds ratio of 1.94, meaning ride-sharing nearly doubles a respondent's chance of experiencing hardship. These results are directionally consistent with our previous analysis, which estimates the effect of making ridesharing available. Our analysis of the matched data provides a plausible estimate of the effect on people who take advantage of ride-sharing when it's made available. This estimate indicates that ride-sharing dramatically increases the probability of hardship.
Discussion
There is an open discussion about how to protect worker welfare in markets with independent workers and the extent to which workers need protecting. On one hand, independent workers are empowered to adjust their work hours in response to their needs, conceivably increasing income and averting hardship. However, workers that substitute gig work for traditional labor also have the freedom to work less than they would have otherwise. Independent workers who are paid per service also bear the risk associated with uncertain demand, increasing income volatility.
We show that, as currently operated, UberX is not beneficial to families with sufficiently low incomes to qualify to file their taxes for free. Families in the population report having a harder time meeting their financial obligations after UberX has launched in their location. We attribute this increase in hardship to reduced net take-home pay -workers in locations with UberX report working fewer hours and earning less than their compatriots without UberX. Moreover, Uber drivers are responsible for their on-the-job expenses, further reducing take-home pay. Financial hardship is partially mitigated by reductions in income volatility following UberX's launch, but this is insufficient to fully compensate for workers' lower pay.
Our analysis makes two main contributions. First, we caution that gigs can be harmful to the most vulnerable members of society. This bolsters the position of Uber drivers suing for employee status and governments seeking to regulate Uber and similar platforms. However, we also find evidence that the effect of UberX's entry depends on socio-economics. Unlike freefileeligible families, freefile-ineligible families experience a boost in income following UberX's launch.
This differential effect suggests that, as currently operated, gig-economy platforms like Uber should avoid positioning themselves as an alternative to low-income hourly wage jobs. These platforms may be better served targeting middle income workers who stand to gain from the gig work arrangement.
Second, our analysis gives guidance for how low-income worker welfare might be preserved within the gig economy framework. We find that increased hardship is driven by decreased takehome pay, not increased income volatility. Indeed, we find that gigs decrease income volatility.
This suggests that regulations designed to boost per-service payments, like New York's cap on rideshare drivers, are more effective than efforts to reduce income volatility, like proposals to impose a minimum hourly wage. These results preserve the hope that some form of gig work may improve the welfare of low-income families by allowing them to mitigate income volatility while ensuring sufficient overall earnings.
These recommendations would be further informed by a deeper dive into the reasons why freefile-eligible workers work less following UberX's entry. We are unable to observe in our data whether reduced work hours are voluntary (e.g. workers uses Uber's flexibility to work less) or involuntary (e.g. a worker's employer reduces his hours because of imitation of or competition with Uber). There may be important behavioral components to a worker's decision to voluntarily reduce his hours. The entrance of UberX may create spillover effects that influence the labor practices in other industries that are worth analyzing. We hope that this open question will inspire inquiries in this direction.
We acknowledge that our analysis relies on self-reported financial outcomes, which can be subject to error or bias. However, this format allows us to measure an important but elusive marker of welfare, which we call hardship. This measure of welfare is particularly relevant to the population we study; families living paycheck to paycheck are primarily concerned with their ability to meet their short-term obligations, and only secondarily concerned about long-run savings.
Future work with granular transaction data recording income, bill arrivals, and bills paid would confirm our results are not driven by bias in self-reporting. 9 Tables   Table 1: Summary Statistics for HFS Notes: This table documents summary statistics for each year studied of the PSID survey. From right to left columns refer to the year in which the survey was administered; the number of survey participants; average annual income of respondents; average annual income from labor; average annual hours spent working by head of household; average annual hours spent working by spouse; percent of respondent population that is married; average age of respondent population; average number of children. Notes: This table documents summary statistics of freefile-eligible families for each year studied of the PSID survey. From right to left columns refer to the year in which the survey was administered; the number of survey participants; average annual income of respondents; average annual income from labor; average annual hours spent working by head of household; average annual hours spent working by spouse; percent of respondent population that is married; average age of respondent population; average number of children. Notes: This table documents summary statistics of freefile-ineligible families for each year studied of the PSID survey. From right to left columns refer to the year in which the survey was administered; the number of survey participants; average annual income of respondents; average annual income from labor; average annual hours spent working by head of household; average annual hours spent working by spouse; percent of respondent population that is married; average age of respondent population; average number of children. Notes: This table illustrates the quality of the match between the treated and control data constructed by a nearest-neighbor propensity score matching algorithm. There are 407 treated observations, each of which is matched to a single control observation. Columns 1 and 2 report the average value of each variable in the treated and control groups, the difference of which is reported in Column 4. Column 3 reports the standard deviation of the variable within the control group. Columns 5, 6, and 7 report the median, mean, and maximum distance between the empirical quantile functions of the treated and control groups. These measures for respondent MSA are omitted for brevity. Data are from survey year 2017. 3 on matched data. The dependent variable indicates whether a respondent failed to pay a bill on time and the independent variable of interest indicates whether the respondent drove for a ride-sharing platform. Additional controls include demographics (race/ethnicity, gender, education, marital status), the education of the respondent's parents, the MSA in which the respondent resides, and unexpected changes in the respondents financial situation (lost a job, fell victim to a crime, experienced a major life change, incurrent an unexpected expense from vehicle repairs, legal fees, home repairs, out-of-pocket medical expenses, or expenses from natural disasters.) * p<0.1; * * p<0.05; * * * p<0.01
